Authorrachit

Effective Slippery Slopes

The quantification of a phenomenon/idea/issue invokes the inner nature of a scientist, math nerd, and analysis junkie, that both of us quite evidently are. But, there are limitations even for the best of things in the world (except for the raps getting W’s – can never get enough of that! #WeTheNorth). When we try and quantify a concept like privacy, instead of creating a potent signal, we end up with more noise. The reason for this is the lack of grey area that gets considered when we translate an interconnected, complex, evolving issue into a number. Yes, these data points may be used in the discussion as a loose feeler for the current state of the given issue, but I don’t think it’s effective beyond that.

Other than trying to strut my natural fanciness, I bolded effective for a reason. I spoke earlier about slippery slopes and their relationship with issues laced with rapid changes and unpredictable futures. What I meant to highlight here is the question of the effectiveness of using slippery slopes as an argumentative tool in order to make a decision on a policy issue. Earlier, I stated that discussing the end of the slippery ride (for example, in the privacy and drone issue, murderous drones raging rampage over our world), is indeed an effective tool to help us underreact in the future by overreacting now. And as you highlighted, the drone in this case, would symbolize a “dead canary” and not a “red-herring”. However, this effectiveness isn’t always the case. The factors governing its utility were brought up in a discussion with the God of Never From Concentrate. I’m fairly agnostic on the whole God thing, but here we must refer to our boy, Mr. Aakash Sahney, as the God of NFC, because if it wasn’t for him, we would’ve never met and NFC would’ve never been born!

So what are these factors that determine the effectiveness of using a slippery slope argument in policy decision making? Or in terms relating directly to our conversation, when is bringing up drones in a discussion about policy a “red-herring” and when is it a “dead-canary”?

One issue with slippery slopes is that we don’t often know where we are on the slope. The end of the slippery slope in the argument against slavery was “maybe we’ll have a black president one day” and that is now, as we reflect on it, the view after a majestic “mountaineering expedition”. The main point in this case is to consider whether we are considering the end of the climb or the fall at the end of the slope, when using this argumentative tool in practice.

The second more pressing issue with slippery slopes is that our legal system has a natural balancing system ingrained within it. When public opinion does a slow 180 on an issue, for example instituting prohibition in the early 20th century, the law was adapted to this change. When we realized that it was a failed policy, and public opinion completed the rest of the pi revolution back to its original state, we changed the laws accordingly. So being experimental with new and/or radical ideas can be highly useful without considering the end of the slope, as we can rely on this natural balancing nature of our legal system. The obvious flaw in this argument is when a marginal dip down a slope has irreversible damage. For example, we take less risks on policy changes that pose potential death risks. This riskiness typically gets brought up in discussion when we’re dealing with infringements on basic fundamental rights — we can use the set of issues outlined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as our set of essential rights. When the consequences related to the change in policy on an issue results on an infringement on one of these rights, we move the cost-benefit analysis from a utilitarian discussion to one that’s more categorical in nature. A stark example of this is our policies on animal testing are discussed from a much more utilitarian viewpoint than any issue related to a potential human death, like euthanasia (not youth in asia to be clear). To further narrow my thesis I mentioned in my last post, slippery slope arguments are effective tools in discussions on policy changes, only if the consequences of the policy change result in either a direct infringement on our essential rights, or a reasonable path can be drawn to reach an infringement on these rights.

The question of whether drones fall under this or not, we shall leave up to the discussion on our podcast next week!

Murder Gandhi and his MQ-9 Reaper

Valentin, no need to beat around the bush here – you’re calling me a Luddite. I can take it. I hold myself to a big boy standard. But you know what, you are probably right … to a certain degree. As you’ve highlighted, “drone” is indeed a buzzword that almost cartoonishly symbolizes the growing privacy concerns that people are facing. Yes, being inquisitive with how some “free” products offered by companies like Facebook or Google affect our privacy is probably a better exercise in practice. But, how these will affect us in the distant future should be just as imperative as how they affect us now. And in this future tense, this ‘drone as a red-herring’, although not directly, may actually serve some real purpose. So as best of a time as any, let me introduce you to Mr. Murder Gandhi:

“Gandhi is offered a pill that will turn him into an unstoppable murderer. He refuses to take it, because in his current incarnation as a pacifist, he doesn’t want others to die, and he knows that would be a consequence of taking the pill. Even if we offered him $1 million to take the pill, his abhorrence of violence would lead him to refuse.

But suppose we offered Gandhi $1 million to take a different pill: one which would decrease his reluctance to murder by 1%. This sounds like a pretty good deal. Even a person with 1% less reluctance to murder than Gandhi is still pretty pacifist and not likely to go killing anybody. And he could donate the money to his favorite charity and perhaps save some lives. Gandhi accepts the offer.

Now we iterate the process: every time Gandhi takes the 1%-more-likely-to-murder-pill, we offer him another $1 million to take the same pill again.

Maybe original Gandhi, upon sober contemplation, would decide to accept $5 million to become 5% less reluctant to murder. Maybe 95% of his original pacifism is the only level at which he can be absolutely sure that he will still pursue his pacifist ideals.

Unfortunately, original Gandhi isn’t the one making the choice of whether or not to take the 6th pill. 95%-Gandhi is. And 95% Gandhi doesn’t care quite as much about pacifism as original Gandhi did. He still doesn’t want to become a murderer, but it wouldn’t be a disaster if he were just 90% as reluctant as original Gandhi, that stuck-up goody-goody.

What if there were a general principle that each Gandhi was comfortable with Gandhis 5% more murderous than himself, but no more? Original Gandhi would start taking the pills, hoping to get down to 95%, but 95%-Gandhi would start taking five more, hoping to get down to 90%, and so on until he’s rampaging through the streets of Delhi, killing everything in sight.”

This is what is considered “a slippery slope” – a small agreed upon trade off in the beginning of bartering, but eventually, the initial conditions slip off to a complete overhaul of the original principles. Suppose we tell Gandhi this information about slippery slopes before he begins bartering the money for the pills. As the article I quoted above further describes, a possible solution for him to avoid this slip into pure murderous rage would be to incorporate what is called a “Schelling fence” (an extension of the Schelling point, coined by Nobel award-winning economist Thomas Schelling). This would be a pre-decided, somewhat arbitrary fence, that Gandhi would agree never to cross. By doing so, he can cash out on the exchanges until this fence is reached, which at that point, everything will come to a halt and the rest of the slope will never be initiated.

This slippery slope argument is often what is cited when dealing with privacy issues (and free-speech as another example). A small compromise in privacy now, may result in a different playing field in the distant future, where another incremental privacy related compromise may be made. Rinse and repeat, until we’re in a dystopic, 1984, hell-hole of a world.

Schelling fences are a possible solution to the slippery slope conundrum, but mostly in theory and not in practice. They deal with precommitments, which as human beings, we aren’t the best at keeping. As well, Schelling fences are much more difficult to coordinate or even establish when there are multiple interest groups involved. However, what this does highlight is that the general issue of short-term policy making that has severe consequences in the unknown, technologically-advanced, and culturally varied future, is an especially difficult problem to solve. It is even further amplified in dealings with privacy, as going backward seems almost impossible once it initially has been compromised. So here comes my thesis point: the ‘luddite’-esque nature of ‘drones’ or similar concerns help us overreact to short-term privacy issueswhich may reflectively be an underreaction in the future. Of course, this is assuming that we are on a potential downwards slippery slope.

So to answer your question directly, I think it may be good to keep around some Luddite-type fears, like the ‘symbolic’ drone, specifically in regards to privacy issues, to avoid the unknown potential downfall on a slide with no bearing in sight.

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If you’re going to a bar, and you’re trying to get your drone on, does that mean you’re going to try and get with the hottest girl there, aka the queen bee? I mean, at the very least, we can try and incorporate this into the mainstream lingo. Maybe create an entry in Urban Dictionary? It can possibly, if ever so slightly, ameliorate the current ‘demolition’ / ‘hell-inducing’ type connotations associated with ‘drone’. Your friends at UTIAS would appreciate it.

~ R

Mr. Peeping Drone

Care for another topic Valentin? WELL I’VE GOT THE JUST THE TOPIC FOR YOU! For only $9.99…

Let’s talk privacy, utilitarianism, and drones. Privacy is a right we are given as a citizen of the developed world. Wait. Let me rephrase that. Some amount of privacy is a right we are given as a citizen of the developed world. There’s that grey area we know and love. Now, I’m not planning to bore you with all the frequently debated internet-related privacy talk. Instead, I am going to narrow the focus of the discussion with privacy and how it relates to our recent trend to use drones (and not the friendly kind you and your buddies use in your aerospace lab).

Our privacy rights are highlighted in section eight of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — “everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure”. Of course, we give up these rights when there is a cause of the search is reasonable – where reasonable is being defined as common-law evolves in different privacy domains. And it is here, as citizens, we make this trade off with our right to privacy. The utility we get for having our privacy invaded – at times unfairly – is worth the result of having a safer society to live in.

Now, where do drones fit into this picture you may ask? Let’s put aside the topic of drones being death-inducing terror monster machines and instead just think about surveillance drones. Nations are using them quite effectively  even in local / non-warfare conflicts. And as you would imagine, the use of drones is already being questioned in its infringement on our privacy rights. As we live in a common-law run government (excluding those Frenchies in Quebec!), the outcome of the use of surveillance drones is yet to be determined. So I ask you the following questions Mr. P:

Are you personally comfortable with surveillance drones to be used locally to serve peace-keeping efforts and increase safety?

If so, where is your line where it becomes unacceptable?

And if you had the power to, would you implement an amendment to privacy rights to include surveillance drones?

The Continuum of Free Will

Mr. Valentin. Lots of points to discuss. Let’s start with the big one.

Fundamentally, we can never know whether or not free will exists or not. It’s why it is primarily a philosophical discussion, and not one rooted in science. We’ve chosen to narrow the focus on this topic to a particular societal problem (performance enhancing drugs) and the implications that result from a world with free will or one without it. This conversation illuminates the  word practicality. My argument is that by taking into account the way human beings have grown up evolutionarily and the “illusion” of free will we believe to possess, we cannot practically function in a society that operates under no free will. We need to feel that we can accomplish goals as a result of our decisive actions, that we can imagine and compose art by the use our creative mind, that we choose to love our wives or husbands, and that our children are ‘special’ in their own way. A lot of these very basic emotions and behaviours that we cherish as a species are rooted in a non-binary free world. (I’ll get to the non-binary part in a bit). If we assume there is no free will whatsoever, we cannot and should not take active ‘pleasure’ from positive experiences. And moreover, people will tend to hold less responsibility for their negative behaviours. Yes, there may be rules and governance set up to ‘fix’ these people — in extreme cases, sending them to a jail, or in less extreme cases, maybe cognitive-behaviour therapy. However, an average Joe will blame himself less for committing a crime, because “I didn’t choose this. It happened to me”. Now, he will still face consequences to his actions, but Joe himself, can he evolve, or improve his behaviour, without an active involvement? A society set up this way feels like every other failed attempt at an imagined utopia.

So what is this non-binary free world I mentioned? This is what our society currently operates under. Specifically in regards to the justice system, in most cases, we consider the do-er responsible for their actions, with a few exceptions to this rule: people with a severely low IQ, young children, and as mentioned earlier, the insanity plea. In these cases, and others as well, we deem the person operating more reactionarily to their environment. You can argue that they still have free will, but with the given inputs they live under,  the probabilistic range of actions they can choose from are inherently broken. And therefore, they cannot be held responsible for their actions. Taking to more extreme cases and ones that are more concentrated in time & context, we can make the argument that the individual only could have reacted in a certain way given the inputs, and had no free will. In certain cases, we deem people to possess free will and in others, we do not. So what does this all mean? It means that we operate under a spectrum of free will, with the same grey area that our society is pervasively befuddled with. And in this grey area, I believe, practically, it is best to live in.

What I do contend to you is making a shift on this grey scale of free-will. For example, a young man, Jerry, who lives under overtly worse socioeconomic conditions than an another fella, Bill, should be treated differently under the justice system. If Jerry is malnourished, grew up in a world with inputs much different and much worse than Bill’s then, and consequently committed a crime, society should make an attempt to “fix” him, as you suggest, rather than put him away. The same may not be true for Bill. This whole idea speaks to the one of the few things I retained from my learnings of psychology in university: the fundamental attribution error. We place too much emphasis on a person’s internal characteristics to explain their behaviour, rather than the more-likely correct, contextual circumstances.

Where does this all fit in with sports? I came across a fantastic article on the topic by Malcolm Gladwell. Give ‘er a read. It speaks to a lot of your points and has honestly shifted my thinking on the topic. To summarize briefly, Gladwell speaks about various natural beneficial genetic mutations that have arisen in the world: iodine enriched coastal regions boosting IQ, Eero Mäntyranta, a red-blood cell rich Olympic gold medalist, baseball players with 20/10 vision, to name a few. He further makes the point that, in the case of Lance Armstrong, his US Postal service team, and cyclists of his era, by injecting themselves with EPO and their own blood, they were “levelling” the genetic playing field.  Tyler Hamilton, one of Lance’s teammates in his run, says in his book The Secret Race:

“EPO granted the ability to suffer more; to push yourself farther and harder than you’d ever imagined, in both training and racing. It rewarded precisely what I was good at: having a great work ethic, pushing myself to the limit and past it. I felt almost giddy: this was a new landscape. I began to see races differently. They weren’t rolls of the genetic dice, or who happened to be on form that day. They didn’t depend on who you were. They depended on what you did—how hard you worked, how attentive and professional you were in your preparation.”

You’re right when said I used the word “shortcut” unfairly . The drug, rather than a shortcut, enabled the individual to work their hardest and push their potential. So instead of letting random chance be in the control of this genetic lottery, you can argue that Armstrong, Hamilton and other competitors were taking genetic fate into their own hands, shifting the grayscale of free will into their own hands, and ultimately testing their particular range of will-power.

~R

Re: Free Will on Steriods

A fresh, topical take on a timeless & riveting philosophical discussion. Don’t mind if I do.

About Mr. Paul Erdos, apparently, he only started taking them at the age of 58 to cope with the loss of his mother, with whom he was very close with. So they may have revitalized his late-mathematics career, but he did not initially take them with intent to perform better. But even if he did do it intentionally, why doesn’t anyone give a crap? I’d say because namely, society doesn’t care about math competitively the way it does with major sports to raise a flag that Erdos was a cheat. It’s also to do with the dynamics of each respective game, where in one, there’s a communal effort to produce truth, and in another, you’re constantly competing for millions of dollars to win a fake trophy.

Now what about free will? In fact, I don’t think it’s much of a discussion within the scope of steroids or anything to do with society and it’s subset of problems.  Society is set up under the assumption that it does indeed exist. We set up laws and rules based on decisions each of us make, that fall on the right or wrong side of said laws and rules. However, I should note, there are such cases where we make exemptions to this notion, where a human being is said to be in a state of no control, and acting reactionarily to their respective environment. For example, defendants often use the insanity plea to escape criminal consequences. But if we are to assume the opposite premise, that there is no free will, then no one would be accountable for their actions (since it’s not up to them), and we would live in an anarchic dystopia. I realize this doesn’t go into the deeper philosophical layer of the discussion, but if we try and practically solve society’s problems sans free will, chaos ensues.

Now, with respect to natural giftedness in contrast with environmentally earned talents, it’s always a balance of both. There are natural talents one is gifted with, such as consciousness, which we all possess, or an inclination to jumping very high, which unfortunately neither of us do. When an athlete decides to give himself an edge in their respective sport, we judge them on this because we operate under the assumption of free will. We realize that he or she is being dishonest (whether you agree with the merit of the use or not, it is illegal nonetheless), and choosing to partake in a ‘shortcut’. The interesting question you raise is with respect to a mother making that decision for the child. Would this ‘super’ child then be able to compete in sports, when the mother had made this decision for them before they were able to object? Does the lack of free will or choice of the child evade them of the responsibility of this decision?

~ R

Re: Science Publicists

From economics + linguistics, we’ve splashed into creating a science police to discussing the branding of the potential end of our modern world. I can say with some confidence, I’ve had a pretty fun time so far.

As far as the spread of false information, I won’t give you another mechanism, but I will highlight the underlying theme in both of them. And that, my friend, is the influence of emotion. Daniel Kahneman, Nobel award winning economist/psychologist, highlights this in his book: Thinking, Fast & Slow. Emotions not only strengthens preexisting biases by mixing our opinions with our ego and contextual feelings, but also, emotions shape our beliefs towards large-scale societal norms.  However, specifically relevant with Biased Assimilation, Kahneman speaks on the topic referring to it as ‘Theory-induced Blindness’ (which may in fact be a better coined term!).

One way he describes to overcome this effect with people is to use ‘mysterious coinage’ when specifically dealing in the realm of science. Instead of calling it ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’, one should use a much more obscure, agnostic word, like ‘system effect 1’ and ‘system effect 2’. Now, it’s not practical for all science topics because people don’t want to count to infinity with ‘system’ and ‘effect’ as prefixes, but there is some logic twisted in there. And it’s simple, it begs people to ask questions and inquire further about the topic rather than making surface level assumptions.

Now, I don’t know how marketable those terms can be, but maybe a balance between a ‘sexy’ advertisable phrase and a rigid ‘emotionless’ term may be the happy medium that science publicity departments are looking for.
~ R

Ecolinguistics & Econolinguistics

As much as I’d love to ride in the limelight, the real credit should go to my professor for coining Econolinguistics. So when you use it to get your high paying job offers or your PhD scholarships from Hahvahd and Stanford, cite him not me. I’m just a humble, lonesome messenger in this game of creative knowledge. Now on to the big ticket items..

Ecolinguistics — the interplay of ecology and language. Interestingly specific. It reminds me of the time when someone first described to me what ‘global warming’ was. My initial reaction from the connotations of the individual words, as I’m sure with many other people, was ‘that sounds awesome!’. Especially as a resident of a country nicknamed The Great White North, who wouldn’t love the idea of longer springs, warmer summers, and a friendlier winter. But of course global warming describes a much harsher portrait of our little globe’s future: the destruction of our wonderfully cozy atmosphere, more severe weather disasters, the destruction of many ecological systems due to melting polar ice caps, and a bunch of other consequences that’ll put a frown on even the happiest of clowns. And to make matters worse, this specific problem in ecology and linguistics goes further than just the choice of words to coin the issue. This study explores the linguistic analysis of words describing the degree of certainty when referring to global warming in mainstream news. As you’d expect, in the news coverage of global warming, the fact of global warming was often alluded to as merely an opinion amongst a choice of many others, and this consequently swayed public opinion & discourse on the topic. After crunching all this info in my noggin, I’ve been led to two conclusions:

1) The scientific community almost definitely needs to allocate funds to quality advertising copywriters when coining new global disasters.

2) There needs to be a better way to control the language when describing what is a speculative theory in science and what is considered scientific fact. Although, it does seem next to impossible without breaching some element of our right to free speech in this beautiful white north nation of ours. Any ideas?

In the marketing crowd, an Econolinguistic Word Value index would definitely be the talk at the water cooler (is that still a valid workplace small talk area?). In the spirit of your idea of incorporating the value of non-native words, such as Häagen-Dazs, I believe localizing the index to regions of the world would account for this factor in word valuation. ‘Toque’ in Canada is worth a lot more than ‘toque’ in the US. In terms of coming up with a distinction between a descriptive product name or a catchy name, I don’t think it would directly fit in this theorized index. However, a corollary that would describe the perceived likeability of certain phonemes may work.

This open index might not yet exist, but I did get to some googling to find out if there may exist some form of a word valuation method that is being used by an organization. Perhaps people might actually pay to hire ‘name consultants’ to assist in the naming of a company or a product… And to my surprise, these companies do indeed exist! Of course, I had to send them an email inquiring about their services. So while I wait for your post next week, I am also anticipating a sliver of a look into the linguistic analysis and cost of how this stuff goes down in the real world.

P.S. Ran out of space to talk about your points/studies on language affecting purchasing decisions. Will hit on that on my next post!

Cheers ‘n stuff, yo.

~R

Econolinguistics

Econolinguistics. It isn’t even a branch of academia. Not even a word in the dictionary. But that’s what we do here at Never From Concentrate. We make shit up, poke at it and see what happens.

So where did this come from you may ask Valentin? I took a linguistics course called English Words through Time & Space in my last semester in university and ended up getting into a discussion with my professor on quantifying the value of a word or morpheme based on an analysis of the URL market. My professor quickly and wisely pointed out that the context is everything. For example, the word face in a URL has a different value than face in a trademark or in the copy of a print advertisement. But, in spite of this, would there be a way to quantify these words and come up with an index of the the relative value of each word? The trademark and URL market are the only two avenues I can think of that has a direct word to value association. I mean, you could analyze copy in advertisement and their relative success, but that would be much too difficult to disassociate all the confound variables that come attached with it.

Now, why would someone spend time to actually collect the data and conduct an analysis you may ask? The honest answer is mostly, just cause I kinda want to know. The business answer would be for marketers to use the index to create more effective copy in their advertisement.

But, before I continue to blab on and in hopes of broadening the discussion and blossoming field of econolinguistics, what are your surface level thoughts on the topic? Are there any tangents of the field you find interesting inherently from the conjunction of economics + linguistics?

In an ideal world, a vote casted by an eligible voter should represent an individual opinion on society’s values. And that vote, should mean something in and of itself.  But you’re right, when things are stable, it seems that we tend to forget about the power of that vote and either get muzzled into the sports-like rivalries the political system creates or become a complacent bystander.

donkeyelephantfight3

So in the spirit of the hazy future of Western democracy that you’ve painted, I thought it would be a useful exercise to explore this problem of voting or lack there of, with some potential, not always sane, solutions. The first and most often cited problem that people allude to is the feeling that their vote doesn’t matter in the sea of a giant populus. Naturally, I thought I’d conduct a quick little test and compare voter turnout to population size. Grabbing some data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website, and with some amateur excel magic, here’s what I got:

 

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Now, I know this analysis is as loose as a lot of things that would degrade the class of this blog. But, there is some common sense logic to what we in the trend above: you’re in a smaller group, so mentally that vote feels like it carries a lot more sway, and thus, people vote more. Now I realize the idea of splitting up nations is not only practically impossible, and economically perilous, but generally a bad idea for a lot of other reasons not worth mentioning. (Although, we could potentially keep this in mind for when we colonize the galaxy). However, a more reasonable thought worth pondering on is the idea to allocate more power to local and municipal government. Could a stronger and much larger municipal government give enough power to an individual’s vote to increase the chances of them participating in the election?

Another idea used in the democratic nations of our world is to make voting a legally mandated act, as it is in Australia, Belgium and Italy. The consequences for not voting in these countries aren’t anything catastrophic; a small fine must be paid if you do not vote. But this begs the question, do we need to channel our inner mother and force our children to eat their broccoli or we take away their allowance? And more importantly, do the votes casted by these unwilling participants dilute the vote of those passionate and caring about their stance?

What other out-of-the-box strategies do you think we could implement to:

1) Increase voter turnout numbers

2) Make a vote feel more important to an individual

Re: Voting: Yay or Nay?

Much like the World Cup, I have no votes to dish out to any particular party. I enjoy my passive involvement in the system for it’s own merits. Go soccer go!

Like boobies, all democracies aren’t created equal. Democracy in this country means something different than democracy in a nation fighting to get it. Living in the first world, with a high standard of living, our basic rights of life are for the most parts satisfied. With our social support structure, public transit and school systems, even living off a minimum wage job can get you by. That minimum wage job, although difficult, can support life, with a small vacay here and there too. Work harder, you can learn some more skills in school and get a better job. All of these basic tenants are created through the values of our society because it’s represented by a democracy. While everyone isn’t particularly satisfied, as demonstrated by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, there is a big enough subset of people, me included, that are happy with the status quo, irrelevant of the particular leadership. These parties we vote for don’t differ to the point that casting a vote for one will mean jeopardizing these rights.

So it’s not a matter of me or many others who didn’t vote, ‘losing faith’ in our political system, it’s us living comfortably in the environment it’s created. In a different political climate, where the citizens feel like the lower pillars of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs are being poached at, a vote would hold a lot more oooompf.